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+```toml
+[advisory]
+id = "RUSTSEC-0000-0000"
+package = "openssl-src"
+aliases = ["CVE-2022-4450"]
+categories = ["denial-of-service"]
+date = "2023-02-07"
+url = "https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20230207.txt"
+[versions]
+patched = [">= 111.25, < 300.0", ">= 300.0.12"]
+```
+
+# Double free after calling `PEM_read_bio_ex`
+
+The function `PEM_read_bio_ex()` reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
+decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload data.
+If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data" arguments are
+populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant decoded data. The
+caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is possible to construct a
+PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data. In this case `PEM_read_bio_ex()`
+will return a failure code but will populate the header argument with a pointer
+to a buffer that has already been freed. If the caller also frees this buffer
+then a double free will occur. This will most likely lead to a crash. This
+could be exploited by an attacker who has the ability to supply malicious PEM
+files for parsing to achieve a denial of service attack.
+
+The functions `PEM_read_bio()` and `PEM_read()` are simple wrappers around
+`PEM_read_bio_ex()` and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
+
+These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
+functions including `PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex()` and
+`SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file()` which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL internal
+uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does not free the
+header argument if `PEM_read_bio_ex()` returns a failure code. These locations
+include the `PEM_read_bio_TYPE()` functions as well as the decoders introduced in
+OpenSSL 3.0.