mirror of
https://github.com/OMGeeky/advisory-db.git
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73 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
73 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
[[advisory]]
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id = "RUSTSEC-2017-0001"
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package = "sodiumoxide"
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patched_versions = [">= 0.0.14"]
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dwf = []
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date = "2017-01-26"
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url = "https://github.com/dnaq/sodiumoxide/issues/154"
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title = "scalarmult() vulnerable to degenerate public keys"
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description = """
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The `scalarmult()` function included in previous versions of this crate
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accepted all-zero public keys, for which the resulting Diffie-Hellman shared
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secret will always be zero regardless of the private key used.
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This issue was fixed by checking for this class of keys and rejecting them
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if they are used.
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"""
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[[advisory]]
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id = "RUSTSEC-2017-0002"
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package = "hyper"
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patched_versions = [">= 0.10.2", "< 0.10.0, >= 0.9.18"]
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dwf = []
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date = "2017-01-23"
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url = "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/wiki/Security-001"
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title = "headers containing newline characters can split messages"
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description = """
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Serializing of headers to the socket did not filter the values for newline bytes (\r or \n),
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which allowed for header values to split a request or response. People would not likely include
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newlines in the headers in their own applications, so the way for most people to exploit this
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is if an application constructs headers based on unsanitized user input.
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This issue was fixed by replacing all newline characters with a space during serialization of
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a header value.
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"""
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[[advisory]]
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id = "RUSTSEC-2017-0003"
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package = "security-framework"
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patched_versions = [">= 0.1.12"]
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dwf = []
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date = "2017-03-15"
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url = "https://github.com/sfackler/rust-security-framework/pull/27"
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title = "Hostname verification skipped when custom root certs used"
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description = """
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If custom root certificates were registered with a `ClientBuilder`, the
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hostname of the target server would not be validated against its presented leaf
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certificate.
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This issue was fixed by properly configuring the trust evaluation logic to
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perform that check.
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"""
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[[advisory]]
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id = "RUSTSEC-2017-0004"
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package = "base64"
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patched_versions = [">= 0.5.2"]
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dwf = []
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url = "https://github.com/alicemaz/rust-base64/commit/24ead980daf11ba563e4fb2516187a56a71ad319"
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title = "Integer overflow leads to heap-based buffer overflow in encode_config_buf"
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date = "2017-05-03"
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description = """
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Affected versions of this crate suffered from an integer overflow bug when
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calculating the size of a buffer to use when encoding base64 using the
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`encode_config_buf` and `encode_config` functions. If the input string
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was large, this would cause a buffer to be allocated that was too small.
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Since this function writes to the buffer using unsafe code, it would
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allow an attacker to write beyond the buffer, causing memory corruption
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and possibly the execution of arbitrary code.
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This flaw was corrected by using checked arithmetic to calculate
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the size of the buffer.
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"""
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