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Add open redirect issue in hyper-staticfile (#1499)
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crates/hyper-staticfile/RUSTSEC-0000-0000.md
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crates/hyper-staticfile/RUSTSEC-0000-0000.md
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```toml
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[advisory]
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id = "RUSTSEC-0000-0000"
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package = "hyper-staticfile"
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date = "2022-12-23"
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url = "https://github.com/stephank/hyper-staticfile/commit/f12cadc6666c6f555d29725f5bc45da2103f24ea"
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categories = ["format-injection"]
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keywords = ["open redirect", "http"]
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[versions]
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patched = ["^0.9.4", ">= 0.10.0-alpha.5"]
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```
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# Location header incorporates user input, allowing open redirect
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When `hyper-staticfile` performs a redirect for a directory request (e.g. a
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request for `/dir` that redirects to `/dir/`), the `Location` header value was
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derived from user input (the request path), simply appending a slash. The
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intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs
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allowed performing a scheme-relative redirect instead.
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An attacker could craft a special URL that would appear to be for the correct
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domain, but immediately redirects to a malicious domain. Such a URL can benefit
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phishing attacks, for example an innocent looking link in an email.
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