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advisory-db/crates/ws/RUSTSEC-2020-0043.md
Tony Arcieri ac125ee29a Translate database into V3 advisory format (#420) 
As proposed in #240 and tracked in #414, this PR translates all
advisories into the new "V3" advisory format, which is based on Markdown
with leading TOML front matter.

This format makes it easier to see rendered Markdown syntax
descriptions, whether rendered by an IDE or GitHub. This should help
with both crafting advisories initially as well as review, and ideally
encourages more lengthy descriptions.

Support for this format shipped in `cargo-audit` v0.12.0 on
May 6th, 2020.
2020-10-01 18:29:11 -07:00

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[advisory]
id = "RUSTSEC-2020-0043"
package = "ws"
categories = ["denial-of-service"]
date = "2020-09-25"
keywords = ["websocket", "dos", "ddos", "oom", "memory", "remotely"]
url = "https://github.com/housleyjk/ws-rs/issues/291"

[versions]
patched = []

Insufficient size checks in outgoing buffer in ws allows remote attacker to run the process out of memory

Affected versions of this crate did not properly check and cap the growth of the outgoing buffer.

This allows a remote attacker to take down the process by growing the buffer of their (single) connection until the process runs out of memory it can allocate and is killed.

The flaw was corrected in the parity-ws fork (>0.10.0) by disconnecting a client when the buffer runs full.