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29 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
29 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
```toml
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[advisory]
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id = "RUSTSEC-2023-0007"
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package = "openssl-src"
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aliases = ["CVE-2022-4304", "GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4"]
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categories = ["crypto-failure"]
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date = "2023-02-07"
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url = "https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20230207.txt"
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[versions]
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patched = [">= 111.25, < 300.0", ">= 300.0.12"]
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```
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# Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
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A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation
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which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a
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Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker
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would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for
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decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,
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RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
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For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an
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encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a
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genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send
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trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a
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sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master
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secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the
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application data sent over that connection.
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